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THE STATE AND FEDERAL QUANDARY
OVER BILLBOARD CONTROLS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LAND USE CONTROL: A New York
law regulating outdoor advertising on private property in the Catskill
and Adirondack Parks held to be constitutional. Modleska Sign
Studios v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255 (1977), cert. denied, -U.S.
(1978).

Were the Man from Mars to swoop over the cratered battlefield of
land use, what he might need most to appreciate the struggle is not
legal acuity, but a strong sense of irony .... The void in which (these
regulatory schemes) swirl is perhaps American land use law's most
characteristic feature; it is certainly its most self-defeating one. 1
In deciding Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, ' the New York Court
of Appeals reaffirmed that private property may be regulated, pur-

suant to the state's police power, for aesthetic purposes alone.' More
notable than the holding was the court's attempt to establish a comprehensive framework for testing the validity of billboard regulations
specifically, and land use controls in general. In effect, the court
mandated a closer scrutiny of constitutional issues; it struck at the
weakness of earlier cases in which due process questions had been
glossed over with undue deference for the far reaches of the police

powers. That the case was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court attests to the tenacious will of property owners to resist land
use restrictions, irrespective of judicial checks. That certiorari was
denied attests to the Supreme Court's continued unwillingness to
become ensnared in an area of law that has been termed "a welter of
confusing and apparently incompatible results." 4 With this responsibility left to the state courts, it is helpful to consider the New York
approach. This note also examines recent Congressional actions that
1. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1045 (1975).
2. 373 N.E.2d 255 (1977), cert. denied, -U.S.
(1978).
3. In 1932, Chief Judge Pond wrote: "Beauty may not be queen, but she is not an
outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the
wing of safety, morality, or decency." Perlmelter v. Green, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 56
(1932). However, it was not until 1967 that the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
aesthetics alone would justify exercises of the police power in land use affairs. Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 255 N.E.2d 749 (1967).
4. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 37 (1964).
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limit the Modjeska ruling and may ultimately herald an end to the
law which has epitomized billboard control: the Federal Highway
Beautification Act.
THE NEW YORK SETTING
To ensure the natural beauty of the Catskill and Adirondack
Parks, the New York legislature passed the state's Environmental
Conservation Law.' This measure prohibits advertising signs and
structures for which a permit is not obtained, except for accessory
signs located within the limits of an incorporated village. Any nonconforming signs erected prior to 1969 were required to be removed
by January 1, 1976. Only two weeks before the deadline, Modjeska
Sign Studios, which owned approximately 96 nonconforming billboards, sought to enjoin the removal of its signs. The suit, brought
before the New York Supreme Court, also asked that the law be
declared unconstitutional because it effected a taking of property
without compensation. These motions were denied and summary
judgment was entered against Modjeska.6 The ruling was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. 7 Modjeska then appealed
to the state's highest court, the New York Court of Appeals.
The case presented an opportunity for the appeals court to clarify
the state's law on noncompensatory regulation. Like most states,
New York has relied increasingly upon the police power to effectuate
a growing list of land use controls. Regulations now extend to
nuisance abatement, business and commercial entities, landmark
preservation, conservation and eradication of eyesores. This "lopsided" expansion of the police power has stirred considerable controversy. 8 In other words, implicit in the police power is the principle that incidental injury to an individual will not prevent its operation, once it is shown to be exercised for a valid public purpose. And
most courts, appreciative of government's limited coffers, rule that
compensation is required only for "takings" of property and not for
losses occassioned by mere regulation. But this is not to say that
courts are comfortable in sustaining such restrictions. In fact, most
courts have found that drawing the "hairline distinction" between
permissible regulation and compensable taking is a difficult task
indeed. 9
In 1967, the New York Court of Appeals warned that police
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW §9-0305 (McKinney 1954).
87 Misc.2d 600, 386 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1976).
55 App. Div.2d 340, 390 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1977).
Supra note 1, at 1048.
See, Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1974).
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power regulations should not extend "to every artistic conformity or
nonconformity" but only to those which bear substantially on the
economic, social and cultural patterns of a community or district.' I
A more precise definition was left for later cases, a shortcoming that
New York courts have wrestled with for the past decade. Often, land
use restrictions were sustained with little or no analysis. In Modjeska,
both the trial and appellate courts concluded, as a matter of law, that
the New York legislature could constitutionally require the removal
of billboards, pursuant to the police power, without compensating
affected property owners. As a result, the reasonableness of the law's
practical application, as a question of fact, was never addressed by
either the state or Modjeska Studios. Nor was Modjeska the only
billboard case in which lower courts had glossed over important
factual determinations.' ' The New York Court of Appeals, in a
subtle approach, ruled that henceforth a regulation must not only be
constitutional on its face, but its validity must also depend upon its
constitutional reasonableness as administered. The court then proceeded with a prototype of the proper analysis.
Looking first to the letter of the law, the court sought to avoid the
conceptual pitfall of classifying the billboard control as either a noncompensable regulation or a compensable taking.' 2 To focus the
issue too narrowly was to ignore that the state's power over private
property spans a wide spectrum. Indeed, the court evoked the notion
of a continuum in which private property interests must yield to the
public good, depending more or less upon overall reasonableness and
the importance of the public good to be achieved. To illustrate its
point, the court postulated several variants of the problem at hand. It
conceded that a regulation requiring the immediate removal of billboards would be unconstitutional in most instances. The obvious
exception is where removal is ordered to protect the public safety.
The court was emphatic that where health and safety interests are at
stake, the police power may be exercised swiftly and without any
form of compensation. But, explained the court, environmental
interests do not usually rise to such lofty levels of justification. While
10. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 255 N.E.2d 749 (1967).
11. Suffolk Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 267 (1977), decided
on the same day as Modjeska.
12. Most courts have treated the police and eminent domain powers as correlatives
whereby regulatory measures exceeding the police power's ambit are ipso facto exercises of
the eminent domain power. And what cannot be done under the police power has to be
done under the eminent domain power or not at all. Referring to the inadequacy of this
approach, Costonis argues that "Deadlock is the inexorable outcome of the taking issue so
portrayed because the legitimate interests of government and of private landowners cannot
both be accommodated within this taut framework. Supra note 1, at 1022.
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aesthetics in itself constitutes a valid base for exercising the police
power, just as safety does, the public benefit gained by aesthetic
objectives is not as compelling. For this reason, the Environmental
Conservation Law provided a seemingly generous amortization
period in which sign owners could ameliorate their losses.
The court concluded that since any restriction upon property is a
deprivation, having the potential of reducing market value, the
characterization of governmental control "turns usually on a difference of degree and only occasionally on a difference in kind."' I
It is only where regulations render the land unsuitable for any
reasonable uses, completely destroying its economic value, that the
action rises to the level of a compensable taking. This is the critical
inquiry.' I The court noted that the billboard law did not impose an
affirmative burden that the land be used exclusively for a public
purpose. Instead, it merely contained a "particular negative restriction-that billboards alone may not be maintained upon specified
property." '
Such a restriction is reasonable, and because it can
hardly be said to destroy the land's economic value, it does not rise
to the level of an unconstitutional taking.
Having found the law to be reasonable on its face, the court next
turned to the validity of its application. It examined the law's sixand-one-half-year amortization scheme. New York was among the
first jurisdictions to sustain the constitutionality of amortization. 6
By allowing property owners a reasonable time in which to recoup
their investments, amortization aims to minimize private losses to
within permissible limits of due process. But the doctrine is more
easily stated than applied, and courts have grappled with defining its
limits. There has been sharp disagreement on whether amortization
affords just compensation for a formal taking, as in eminent domain,
or whether it merely serves to achieve the reasonableness that is
requisite to an exercise of the police power.'" The answer to this
important question obviously determines that factors must be
weighed in testing a provision's constitutionality.
Amortization based upon eminent domain requires a recouptnent
period based upon the structure's useful life or highest market value.
13. 373 N.E.2d at 258.
14. This principle was enunciated in U.S. v. Central Eureks Mining Co. 357 U.S. 155
(1958). Costonis refers to it as "the only generalization that can be confidently extrapolated
from the welter of confiscation precedents, supra note 1, at 1051.
15. 373 N.E.2d at 260.
16. See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958) and Anderson,
Amortization of Nonconforming Uses-A Preliminary Appraisal of Harbison v. City of
Buffalo, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44 (1958).
17. Supra note 1, at 1058.

July 19791

BILLBOARD CONTROLS

A police power scheme requires only that which is reasonable. Not
surprisingly, New York follows the latter approach. The court in
Modjeska stated: "While an owner need not be given that period of
time necessary to permit him to recoup his investment entirely, the
amortization period should not be so short as to result in a substantial loss of his investment." 1 8 Under this approach, a provision's
constitutionality turns primarily upon the degree of economic injury
imposed. In determining what constitutes.a substantial loss, the court
suggested an examination of several factors: the nature of the nonconforming activity; initial capital investment and investment realization to date; life expectancy of the structure; and the existence or
nonexistence of a lease obligation.
The court concluded that most billboard removal regulations
should "pass constitutional muster." 1 But it cautioned that the
reasonableness of any amortization period is a question of fact that
must be determined from the circumstances of each particular case.
Because the issue had not been addressed in the Modjeska case, it was
remanded and the sign studio was given an opportunity to challenge
the amortization period. Instead, the studio chose to make its unsuccessful appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
THE IMPACT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

The Modjeska case is a reaffirmation of one state's desire to
regulate land use for the public benefit. But the decision stands atop
shaky ground at a time when federal leadership is backsliding and the
Federal Highway Beautification Act (Beautification Act) has been
doomed to failure. When the late President Lydon Johnson signed
the Act in 1965, he predicted that it would "bring the wonders of
nature back into our daily lives."' 2 The ambitious goal of the Beautification Act was to remove unsightly billboards and junkyards from
along all highways built in part with federal funding. But today the
program is widely considered a failure. And Congress, caught between budgetary restraints and pressure from the billboard lobby,
has stripped away the Beautification Act's effectiveness. So complete
and far-reaching is this reversal, that it appears as if the Modjeska
case would be decided differently today.
Last November, Congress passed the Federal Aid to Highway Act
of 1978 (Highway Act). 2 1 The Highway Act is a four-year funding
18.
19.
20.
1978,
21.

373 N.E.2d at 262.
Id
23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976), as amended by Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
Pub. L. No. 95-599, §122, 92 Stat. 2689 (1978).
Id (Also known as the Surface Transportation Act).
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and construction authorization for highways, transportation safety
and mass transit-the largest and most comprehensive transportation
program in United States history. 2 2 Included in the Highway Act is
an amendment that bolsters the compensation requirement of the
Beautification Act. 2 ' In fact, it prohibits states from denying "just"
compensation for the removal of any nonconforming sign from along
federally-aided highways. Henceforth, states must pay compensation,
even where the signs are removed pursuant to state and local ordinances and have been up long enough to repay the owner's initial
investment. A report of the Public Works and Transportation Committee expresses Congressional displeasure over attempts to usurp its
mandates:
The employment of State or local general zoning laws or ordinances

to remove lawfully erected signs that are nonconforming under the
Highway Beautification Act, without the payment of just compensa-

tion, is an obvious 2circumvention
of the compensation requirements
4
of the Federal law.
Indeed, the lawmakers rejected a Senate version allowing states to
impose regulations stricter than the federal law, in which case, the
compensation requirement would not have applied. 2 I
New York was among the states which Congress felt were attempting to circumvent the federal law. The issue was raised in Modjeska,
but was summarily dismissed by the New York courts. 2 6 The sign
studio had argued that provisions of the New York Highway Law,
enacted to implement the Beautification Act, require that compensation be paid for all signs removed in accordance with the federal
law.2 7 But the New York courts held that the Environmental Conservation Law, enacted at a later date, evidenced a legislative intent
to provide an amortization period in lieu of paying compensation.
The courts also ruled that the New York legislature, by passing the
compensation provision of the New York Highway Law, had not
relinquished its right to act in the same area pursuant to its police
powers. Obviously, this is precisely the kind of ruling that the new
law now prohibits. The irony is that congressional action came too

22. H.R. REP. NO. 1485, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprintedin [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7295, 7297.
23. Id. at 7311; Pub. L. No. 95-599, § 122, 92 Stat. 2689 (1978).
24' Id.
25. H. CONFERENCE REP. NO. 1795, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [19791 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7413, 7425.
26. 373 N.E.2d at 263.
27. Id
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late to help Modjeska Studios. Had the amendment been enacted
earlier, Modjeska stood to win a sizable award-virtually all of its
signs were located along federally-aided highways. 2
CONCLUSION
While it is clear that compensation must now be paid when signs
are removed from along federally funded highways, it is less clear
where the money will come from. The Beautification Act provides
that 75 percent of such compensation shall be provided by the federal government and the remainder paid by the states. However,
federal funding has been erratic at best.' 9 In the fourteen years that
the Beautification Act has been law, only 88,000 billboards have
been removed; as many as 450,000 offending signs remain along an
approximate million miles of interstate, primary and secondary highways. 3" While the Federal Highway Administration places the cost
of removing these signs at 1.3 billion dollars, the current budget
provides only 13 million dollars for the removal program. Next year
there may be no money available for the removal program. President
Carter has eliminated all sign removal funding from his proposed
1980 budget, pending the outcome of a Transportation Department
study of whether the program is even worth maintaining."
Thus, although Congress is adamant that compensation must be
paid, neither Congress nor the Administration shows any inclination
to allocate the necessary funding. And because the money is not
forthcoming, the Beautification Act is rendered ineffective. The
Beautification Act itself provides that no signs shall be required to be
removed if the federal share of compensation is not available.3 2 The
result is an intolerable impasse. Environmentalists have withdrawn
their support of the program, while billboard-trade organizations
now favor it.3" Senator Robert Stafford (R. Vermont) believes it is
time to admit that the Beautification Act is a failure and should be
28. Id.
29. 23 U.S.C. § 13 1(g) (1976). Federal funding for the removal program has ranged from
$75.5 miionin 1967 to $10 milloin in 1971.
30. NEWSWEEK, March 5, 1979, at 18. At the current level of funding, it would take
110 years to tear down all the billboards.
31. Id.
32. 23 U.S.C. § 131(n) (1976). Nevertheless, states may perceive themselves as being in a
Catch-22 situation. Although compliance with the Beautification Act is not mandatory,
§ 13 1(b) provides that if a state does not make legislative provision for such removal and
payment, it shall lose ten percent of its share of federal highway funds.
33. Supra note 29.
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repealed. He has introduced a bill that would allow states and cities
to enact their own beautification programs.3 4
These recent actions have not only brought the sign removal effort
to a virtual halt, but they also threaten to reverse the trend-more
signs will begin springing up. Indeed, Congress already has created
something of a loophole in the present law. In 1976, it passed a
little-noticed amendment to the Beautification Act. This change
allowed state governments to request exemption for billboards if,
after "rigorous economic analysis," they can prove that an economic
hardship would result from their removal.3" Thus far, New Mexico is
the only state to seek exemption status. In 1977, the New Mexico
legislature passed a bill authorizing local governments to take such
steps as necessary for qualifying their locales as exempted hardship
areas.' 6 Although other states have not yet taken advantage of the
loophole, an official in New Mexico marvels that, "people from all
and California have been calling us up to
over the country, New 3York
7
find out what we did."
It is apparent then that both Congress and state legislatures are
willing to take a second look at the economic consequences of otherwise desirable land use programs. The issue of noncompensatory
regulation refuses to fade away, but instead resurges with greater
intensity. And the lasting impact of police power regulations is
threatened by the inevitable political backlash they generate among
such formidable powers as the real estate and advertising communities, not to mention thousands of aggrieved property owners. Yet,
it is also apparent that the public supports, and indeed demands,
effective land use control. The obvious challenge is to accommodate
both the public need and the legitimate concerns of property
owners-not an easy task in these times of rising inflation and
budgetary restraint. The answer apparently lies in devising new, intermediate compensation formats: for example, regulations that would
not displace either the police or eminent domain powers, but which
would provide alternative measures of fair compensation, secured
34. S. 344, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S. 1124 (1979). In introducing the
bill, Stafford said his personal preference would be to eliminate the myraid loopholes in the
existing law, "but the public sentiment for more beautiful roads on the national level seems
too weak to stand up against a strong, organized industry lobby."
35. 23 U.S.C. § 131(o) (1976). During the debate over the 1978 highway act, House and
Senate conferees emphasized that the Secretary of Transportation should fully assist those
states wanting to take advantage of the provision; they warned that Congress would not
tolerate any effort to undermine the exemption. H. CONFERENCE REP. NO. 1795, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7413, 7425.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-14-1 (1978).
37. The Albuquerque Journal, November 23, 1978, §D, at 1.
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either by money or fair market exchanges and trade-offs. Only then
will the inexorable deadlock now plaguing land use affairs be broken.
It is a development that could well reach to the very definition of
property itself.
FRANCES BASSETT ROMERO

